Cārvāka and Nyāya — Pratyakṣa Alone vs the Four Pramāṇas

Both traditions take epistemology seriously as a foundation for philosophy. Both agree that direct perception is genuine knowledge. Both argue from first principles rather than scripture.

Both traditions operate within the framework of Indian pramāṇa theory — the discipline of specifying the valid means of knowledge and their scope.

Cārvāka: only pratyakṣa (direct perception) is a valid pramāṇa. Inference (anumāna) depends on the principle that a mark reliably indicates its referent — but this principle can only be established by observing all past and future cases, which is impossible. Inference is therefore always uncertain.

Nyāya: inference is a valid pramāṇa when properly formed. The vyāpti (universal relation) between smoke and fire is not established by observing all cases but by observing a representative sample and applying the principle of uniformity of nature. Nyāya's entire project — including its famous proofs for God's existence (Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali) — depends on defending inference.

The deepest question: can a mark (liṅga) ever reliably indicate something beyond it? Cārvāka says no — we have only seen smoke accompanying fire in our limited experience; we cannot know this holds universally. Nyāya replies: the objection applies to every generalisation, including Cārvāka's own claim that 'perception alone is valid' — which is itself not known by perception alone.

This is the self-refutation argument. Cārvāka's restriction of knowledge to perception cannot itself be justified by perception — it is a philosophical principle, requiring inference and argument. Nyāya presses this consistently: radical empiricism cannot justify its own foundations.

Cārvāka: the self is the body. Consciousness is an emergent property of the material body. No soul, no rebirth.

Nyāya: the self (ātman) is a real, individual, eternal substance. It has properties — knowledge, desire, pleasure, pain — that are not material. The self's existence is inferred from features of experience that cannot be explained materialistically.

Cārvāka: no liberation — there is no soul to liberate. Death is the end. The highest good is pleasure in this life.

Nyāya: liberation (apavarga) is the complete cessation of all qualities of the self — including pleasure and pain — in a state of pure, contentless existence. Achieved through correct knowledge of the self and the categories.

Nyāya's self-refutation argument against Cārvāka is widely considered decisive: the claim 'only perception is valid' is not itself perceptually verifiable. Cārvāka's strength is its clarity: it demands that every metaphysical claim be grounded in direct evidence. Its weakness: it cannot defend its own epistemological foundation by its own standard.